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NOTES
ANTITRUST LAW-RESTRAINT OF TRADEAntitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price
Information Among Competitors:
The Container Corporation Case
Traditionally, it has not proved difficult to find policy considerations which justify the existence of programs of price information
exchange among competitors. There has been widespread agreement
that businessmen require knowledge of all the economic forces which
affect their operations. Justice Holmes once said: "I should have
thought that the ideal of commerce was an intelligent interchange
made with full knowledge of the facts as a basis for the forecast of
the future on both sides."1 Similarly, Justice Brandeis commented
that "[t]he Sherman Law ... certainly does not command that competition shall be pursued blindly, that business rivals shall remain
ignorant of trade facts or be denied aid in weighing their significance."2 It has traditionally been accepted that the competitive ideal,
which serves as the ratio essendi for the antitrust laws, is best served
by full knowledge on the part of buyers and sellers of their respective
choices.3 It is admitted that the pattern of transaction prices in a market characterized by full knowledge would be different from the pattern in a market characterized by ignorance. 4 Some prices would be
higher, some would be lower. Some customers would be denied bargains and some would gain them. But an essential order, a stability
would be introduced into the system and arguably would enable
the system to operate more efficiently than would random confusion.
In practice, however, the dissemination of price information has
not always served the competitive ideal. In a classic comment Adam
Smith observed that "[p]eople of the same trade seldom meet
together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation
1. American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 412 (1921)
(dissenting opinion).
2. American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 415 (1921)
(dissenting opinion).
3. See Turner, Cooperation Among Competitors, 61 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 865, 866 (1967).
See also Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 584-85 (1925):
Persons who unite in gathering and dissemination of information in trade
journals and statistical reports on industry, who gather and publish statistics as
the amount of production of commodities in interstate commerce, and who report
market prices, are not engaged in unlawful conspiracies in restraint of trade
merely because the ultimate result of their efforts may be to stabilize prices
or limit production through a better understanding of economic laws and a more
general ability to conform to them for the simple reason that the Sherman Law
neither repeals economic laws nor prohibits the gathering and dissemination of
them.
4. See note 74 infra.
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ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to
raise prices."5 On numerous occasions antitrust actions have been
successfully brought against competitors who, under the guise of some
type of statistical reporting service involving not only price but
production, inventory, and shipments data, have conspired to fix
prices and divide markets. 6 The most recent example is United States
v. Container Corporation of America.7
Between 1955 and 1963, Container Corporation of America and
seventeen other corporate manufacturers, which together supplied
ninety per cent of the shipments of corrugated containers in the
southeastern United States,8 engaged in an informal exchange of
price information. Whenever one of these manufacturers needed
sales information, not available from another source, as to the most
recent price charged or quoted by a competitor to a specific customer
for a particular product, the manufacturer would simply request
the information directly from that competitor. The competitor
would then furnish current price information with the understanding that it would, upon request at some future date, receive similar
information.
The United States Government filed suit in a federal district
court, alleging that the container manufacturers' scheme constituted
a "continuing agreement . . . among the defendants to exchange
among themselves information respecting prices ... for the purpose
and with the effect of restricting price competition among themselves .... " 9 The district court, unable to find that the Government
had demonstrated the presence of either collusion or adverse effects
upon price competition, dismissed the action.10 The Supreme Court
of the United States, however, on direct appeal,11 reversed the district court's decision, holding that the informal exchange of price
information had the effect of chilling the vigor of price competition
5. THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 128-29 (Modem Library ed. 1937).
6. Prior to United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969), there
had been six leading decisions involving the exchange of price information: five Su•
preme Court cases [American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377
(1921); United States v. American Linseed Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371 (1923); Maple Flooring
Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563 (1925); Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v.
United States, 268 U.S. 588 (1925); Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553
(1936)) and a major decision from a federal circuit court [Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC,
17-1 F.2d 452 (1st Cir. 1949)).
7. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
8. For the purposes of the Container Corporation case, the southeastern United
States was defined as including the states of Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky,
North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia. United States v. Container
Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 21·22 (M.D.N.C. 1967).
· 9. 273 F. Supp. at 20.
10. 273 F. Supp. at 67-68.
11. Direct appeal is authorized under the Federal Antitrust Expediting Act § 2,
15 u.s.c. § 29 (1964).
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and was within the scope of the ban expressed in United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Company,12 and thus constituted price fixing and
a restraint of trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.13
The Court's holding in Container Corporation must, of course,
be examined against the backdrop of previous cases involving exchanges of statistical data among competitors. Antitrust difficulties
involving such systems of exchange have historically occurred in
industries, like the corrugated-container industry, in which the chief
product is highly fungible and standardized, and in which competition is based primarily on price.14 Thus, in American Column &
Lumber Company v. United States15 the members of the Hardwood
Lumber Manufacturers' Association submitted to the manager of
the association detailed and specific daily reports describing aspects
of business activity which were relevant to the price level. 16 The information was disseminated to all member manufacturers, although
not to buyers or other interested parties. The Supreme Court had
no difficulty in finding that the Association clearly constituted a combination to restrict competition and to restrain interstate commerce.17 Similarly, in United States v. American Linseed Oil Company18 the Court was presented with an intimate system for the
exchange of price information. The Court found that the information, which was used exclusively and secretly by the sellers of linseed
products, was clearly aimed at discouraging independent decision
making by trade rivals. 19 Any freedom of action with regard to
12. 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
13. Sherman Act § I, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964), provides in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint
of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign nations is declared
to be illegal .•••"
14. The origin of statistical reporting services in trade associations is usually traced
to the work of Arthur Jerome Eddy, who, in his book, The New Competition, denounced the Spencerian notion of the survival of the economic fittest. Alarmed by
what he perceived to be the viciousness of price competition, he suggested that, "so
far from promoting progress, competition stays and hinders •••• Rightfully viewed,
there is not a single good result accomplished by man in ••• economics ••• that
should not be attained by intelligent and far sighted cooperation." A. EDDY, THE NEW
COMPETITION 26 (1912). See also Stocking, The Rule of Reason, Workable Competition,
and the Legality of Trade Association Activities, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 527, 543 (1954).
15. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
16. The Hardwood Lumber Manufacturers' Association program was patterned
after Eddy's work. See note 14 supra. T.b.e slogan of the Association, "Cooperation,
not Competition, is the Life of Trade," was borrowed from Eddy. Stocking, supra
note 14, at 545.
17. The Supreme Court quoted the following excerpt from a letter of the Association manager: "With this information before him it is difficult to see how any
intelligent hardwood manufacturer can entertain any hesitation as to the proper course
for him to pursue in selling his lumber." 257 U.S. at 405.
18. 262 U.S. 371 (1923).
19. 262 U.S. at 389.
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deviation from the agreed plan was forestalled by heavy penalty
provisions. In both American Column and American Linseed Oil
unlawful conspiracies were found to exist, but in both cases the
Court condemned only the anticompetitive results of the conspiracy,
not the practice of exchanging price information.
Sugar Institute v. United States20 involved a thoroughly demoralized sugar industry with sales running at fifty per cent of capacity.21
In an effort to offset this industry-wide malaise, some individual
sellers developed the practice of giving secret price concessions. To
combat this practice the Sugar Institute was formed, and it inaugurated a price-reporting plan which called for sellers to announce in
advance any increase in price. A short waiting period followed, during which time buyers could still buy at the old price and yet other
sellers could announce price increases. In practice, if the entire industry did not follow the price leader, that leader had to rescind its
announced increase since it could not sell at the higher price. The
Supreme Court sustained the trial court's finding that the Institute's
dominant purpose was "to create and maintain a uniform price
structure .... " 22 Even in this case, however, the Court expressly reserved condemnation of the statistical-reporting system involved,
even though that system included the reporting of advance prices.
Rather, what the Court condemned was the agreement to adhere to
announced prices and terms.23
The companion cases of Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association v. United States24 and Cement Manufacturers' Protective Association v. United States25 have often been referred to as the Magna
Carta of statistical-reporting programs.26 The Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association maintained a statistical-reporting service for
its members, who were responsible for about seventy-five per cent of
the industry's production.27 The data which members of the Association reported consisted of (1) the average cost of all dimensions
and grades of flooring, (2) comprehensive freight shipping costs, (3)
the prices and kinds of flooring sold and the amount of inventory
20. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
21. 297 U.S. at 574-77.
22. 297 U.S. at 577.
23. 297 U.S. at 601:
The unreasonable restraints which defendants imposed lay not in advance announcements, but in the steps taken to secure adherence, without deviation, to
prices and terms thus announced. It was that concerted undertaking which cut
off opportunities for variation in the course of competition .•••
See Comment, Trade Restraints-Trade Association-Open Price Agreements-Sugar
Institute Case, 34 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1016 (1936).
24. 268 U.S. 563 (1925).
25. 268 U.S. 588 (1925).
26. See G. LA.,m &: s. KrITELLE, TRADE AssocIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 33 (1956).
27. 268 U.S. at 566.
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on hand, and (4) miscellaneous other information exchanged at
meetings of industry executives.28 Among the price information
cases which the Court has considered, its opinion in Maple Flooring
is unique, for in this case the Court dealt exclusively with the practice of statistical reporting itself. The Court stated that "it is neither
alleged nor proved that there was any agreement among the members of the Association either affecting production, fixing prices or
for price maintenance."29 Instead of dealing with such an agreement, then, the Court concerned itself with the contention of the
Government that the result of the dissemination of this type of
information
must necessarily be to bring about a concerted effort on the part
of members of the Association to maintain prices at levels having
a close relation to the average cost of flooring reported to members
and that consequently there is a necessary and inevitable restraint
of interstate commerce and that therefore the plan of the Association
itself is a violation of § I of the Sherman Act which should be enjoined regardless of its actual operation and effect so far as price
maintenance is concemed.30
The Supreme Court rejected the Government's argument. It found
no illegal plan or conspiracy, either express or implied, to use the
material gathered as part of some illegal undertaking. In sweeping
language the Court affirmed the legality-indeed, the desirabilityof exchanges of information, including prices, in order to encourage
competitive interchange.31
Container Corporation, as Justice Douglas admitted in his opinion for the Court, differed appreciably in its facts from all of these
previous cases involving the exchange of price information among
competitors. The Court point out that
[t]here was here an exchange of price information but not agreement
to adhere to a price schedule as in Sugar Institute .•. or ... Socony28. 268 U.S. at 566-67.
29. 268 U.S. at 567.
30. 268 U.S. at 568.
31. 268 U.S. at 584-85, quoted in note 3 supra.
Cement Manufacturers involved the collection and dissemination of information
relating to "specific job contracts" for the purpose of enabling manufacturers to protect themselves from being defrauded by their customers. "Specific job contracts"
operated in effect to give contractors options to buy at a set price all the cement
needed for a particular job. In times of rising prices, however, some contractors ap·
parently had been exploiting this trade practice by taking more than one specific job
contract for each job and then using cement bought under contracts for one job on
other jobs. The information program which the manufacturers' association developed
to meet this problem was held not to violate the Sherman Act because the information
did not affect the manufacturers' price decisions but only notified manufacturers when
they would be justified in refusing to deliver cement at the contract price.
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Vacuum . . . . There was here an exchange of information concerning specific sales to identified customers, not a statistical report
on the average cost to all members, without identifying the parties
to specific transactions as in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. ... While
there was present here as in Cement Mfrs. Protective Assn. v. United
States . . • an exchange of prices to specific customers, there was
absent the controlling circumstances, viz., that cement manufacturers
to protect themselves from delivering to contractors more cement
than was needed for a specific job and thus receiving a lower price,
exchanged price information as a means of protecting their legal
rights from fraudulent inducements to deliver more cement than
needed for a specific job.a2

In many ways, then, the factual pattern considered by the Court in
Container Corporation constitutes the least persuasive record of
price fixing and manipulation that can be found among all such
cases with which the Supreme Court has dealt, including Maple
Flooring. 33
But the major distinction between Container Corporation and
its predecessors does not seem to lie in the facts. The price exchange
system in this case involved no really novel practice-no practice
which was not more or less implicitly approved in a prior case. For
example, the exchange of specific information, present here and
absent in Maple Flooring, was approved not only in Cement Manufacturers,34 but also in a major case from the First Circuit, Tag
Manufacturers' Institute v. FTC.35
Container Corporation, then, is not to be distinguished on its
facts, but rather should be examined in terms of the legal principles
applied to the factual situation-legal principles which are brought
into focus by the juxtaposition of the majority, the concurring, and
the dissenting opinions.36 But before examining the areas of disagreement among members of the court, it should be noted that in
82. 898 U.S. at 834-35.
8!1. See Stocking, supra note 14, at 546-67, in which Professor Stocking analyzes the
record in Maple Flooring and sharply disagrees with the result reached by the Court
in that case; Container Corp., 39!1 U.S. at !141, 347 CTustice Marshall, dissenting);
text accompanying notes 55-56 infra.
34. See note 81 supra.
35. 174 F.2d 452 (1949). In Tag Manufacturers, as in Container Corporation, the
product was custom made. Information was not exchanged informally, however, but
by price tables regularly sent out through a trade association to all competing
manufacturers and to other interested parties. The effect of the information exchanged
was, as in Container Corporation, a knowledge by all manufacturers of the price which
was quoted to a customer in any given transaction, since there was little off-the-list
selling. But the association did not exchange information concerning the actual identity
of customers as the defendants in the Container Corporation case apparently did.
36. The opinion of the Court was written by Justice Douglas; Justice Fortas filed
a concurring opinion, and Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart,
dissented. See text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
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several instances the Container Corporation Court was in unanimous
agreement. For example, both the majority and the dissent dealt
summarily with the questions of intent and conspiracy, which had
previously occupied so much of the Court's time. The trial court
held that the Government had "failed to sustain its burden of
proving facts from which an agreement to exchange price information may be inferred."37 That court expressed the view, shared by
by some commentators,38 that the proper standard of proof is a
rather stringent one,39 and that "[p]roof of a course of conduct by
defendants, or parallel business behavior, does not necessarily require an inference or conclusion that a conspiracy actually existed."40
Indeed, the trial court suggested that "[t]he conceded freedom of
each defendant to request from or furnish to competitors, or not
request from or furnish to competitors, price information on corrugated containers, is the very antithesis of an agreement." 41 The
Supreme Court, however, unanimously rejected the trial court's
position and experienced little difficulty in finding that an agreement existed among the defendants to exchange information. It
agreed that there was freedom to withdraw from the agreement, but
noted that "[t]he fact remains that when a defendant requested and
37. United States v. Container Corp. of America, 273 F. Supp. 18, 58-59 (M.D.N.C.
1967).
38. See A. NEALE, THE ANTI-TRUsr LA.ws OF THE USA 49-53 (1966):

Collusion means in this context a real "meeting of the minds" in a common endeavor to suppress or limit price-competition; moreover, it is implied that the
plan or understanding can be relied upon with some reasonable confidence by the
participants. The individual firm, in other words, must be under some fairly
effective inhibition as regards "breaking the price-line" when the temptation to
do so is apparently strong.
The Container Corporation decision seems to diminish the importance of the intent
factor within the area of exchanges of price information. According to the decision,
so long as the conscious joint conduct of the competitors has a tendency to "stabilize
prices," whether or not that tendency is the intended consequence of the exchange,
the requisite "agreement" will be found to exist. But see United States v. FMC Corp.,
5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,901 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1969), in which
a federal district court appears to have imposed a harsher burden of proving conspiracy
than that imposed in Container Corporation. The district court cited Container
Corporation, perhaps somewhat restrictively, for the proposition that "[t]he systematic •
exchange of price information by competitors pursuant to an understanding or agreement that such information will be exchanged whenever requested, and the use of
such information to stabilize prices, constitutes an unlawful conspiracy and per se vio•
Iation of § I of the Sherman Act." 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) ,I 72,901,
at 87,433. See text accompanying note 86 infra. An alternative type of reasoning
has been used in cases such as American Column &: Lumber Co. v. United States, 257
U.S. 377 (1921). In this type of case, agreement is inferred from the behavior of the
parties. The fact situation is analyzed and an attempt is made to prove that such a
state of affairs could not be maintained without collusion. Conversely, in Container
Corporation, as in most of the other trade association cases, the existence of an agreement is virtually assumed and the court concerns itself with examining the consequences of that agreement. See A. NEALE, supra, at 49-50.
39. Cf. Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Pktures Film Distrib. Co., 346 U.S.
537 (1954).
40. 273 F. Supp. at 59.
41. 273 F. Supp. at 59.
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received price information, it was affirming its willingness to furnish
such information in return." 42 Both the majority and dissent indicated that the exchange of price information is clearly a disfavored
activity and that the burden of proof needed to establish an unlawful
conspiracy in this area can be sustained by a minimal amount of
evidence. In Container Corporation, then, the entire Court was
much more interested in the effect of the combination upon prices
than it was in the combination's form and nature.
The majority, the concurrence, and dissent in Container Corporation also agreed on the basic economic theory to be used in analyzing the effect of the defendants' agreement on competition.
Although the Court tacitly acknowledged that the exchange of information could theoretically be regarded as a desirable means to
encourage competitive conditions, it recognized that this result could
occur only within the context of a perfectly competitive economic
model. All three of the opinions filed in the case indicated that an
entirely different economic theory, one which recognizes the oligopolistic character of the market involved, was more appropriate.
In an oligopolistic market, characterized by a highly fungible and
standardized product, a decidedly anticompetitive effect may occur
as a result of the dissemination of at least some forms of price information. 43 A rational seller in such an industry may well decide
that there is no potential advantage in price competition. Any price
made by one seller in an oligopoly is quickly met by another. Such
a seller is aware that "a lower price does not mean a larger share
of the available business but a share of the existing business at a
lower return." 44 Modern economics recognizes that prices determined in a market occupied by a few sellers selling a standardized
product do not behave in accordance with the competitive ideal.
In a situation in which a few sellers face substantially identical demands and costs, each, acting independently but with some price
information from the others, might restrict output and charge artificially higher prices. Indeed, it is generally accepted that, in such
a market, "[i]f each [of two or a few sellers] seeks his maximum
profit rationally and intelligently ... the equilibrium result is the
same as though there was a monopolistic agreement between them."45
Each, in effect, acts as a monopolist. As one commentator has remarked:
To the extent that the sellers anticipate each other's reactions and
42. 393 U.S. at 335.
43. Bradley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman and Clayton Acts: From Economic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. REv. 285 (1967).
44. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 337.
45. E. CHAMBERLAIN, THE THEORY OF MoNOPOLimc COMPETITION 48 (6th ed. 1950).
See also Stocking, supl'a note l 4, at 535.
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become of one mind, they behave like one seller-a monopolist. But
it is not the number of sellers which is crucial. Some uncertainty,
some good gambling chance that price cuts will not be immediately
met, is necessary for effective competition. Some degree of ignorance
is therefore no blemish or imperfection in a market; it is an advantage. Too much ignorance, however, keeps buyers from responding to price cuts.46
With its enthusiastic embrace of the economic theory of oligopolistic pricing, the Supreme Court continued to expand its attack
on the abuse of power in oligopolistic markets. Students of the Court
date this attack from the case of Brown Shoe Company v. United
States.41 Prior to Container Corporation, however, the attack had
been directed primarily against mergers, joint ventures, and the distribution practice of consignment selling.48 Container Corporation
seems to have expanded the scope of oligopolistic conduct violating
the antitrust laws to other behavioral areas. Historically, a violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act was a violation no matter who committed it.49 Conduct proscribed by section 2, on the other hand,
could constitute perfectly legitimate conduct when engaged in by
. a normal businessman, although it violated the Act when it was committed by a monopolist.50 After Container Corporation, there seems
to be a middle ground of new section I violations, which can be
committed only by an oligopolist. Thus, certain modes of behavior
by an oligopolist, while not violative of section 2, can violate section
I even though similar behavior by a "true competitor" would not.
In Container Corporation, then, the Court was in agreement concerning the nature of the conspiracy and concerning the oligopolistic
framework within which the alleged misconduct was to be analyzed.
However, the Court found itself in sharp internal disagreement as
to whether the fact situation presented by the Government fit within
the applicable oligopolistic pattern. Justice Douglas and the majority
46. Adelman, Effective Competition and the Anti-Trust Laws, 61 HARV. L. R.Ev.
1289, 1299 (1948). See also c. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, ANTITRUST POLICY, AN ECONOMIC
AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 150 (1959): "In markets where oligopolistic elements are present
some ignorance and uncertainty about the behavior of rivals is an important competitive element in the market, since it prevents 'rational' oligopolistic calculation leading
to joint maximation of profits.''
47. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Brodley, supra note 43, at 299.
48. E.g., United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966) (horizontal merger);
FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965), revg. 329 F.2d 623 (7th Cir.
1964), revg. CCH TRADE REG. REP. [1961-1963 Transfer Binder] ,f 16,182 (FTC 1962)
(conglomerate merger); United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964) Goint
venture); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964) (retail price maintenance
through consignment agreements).
49. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940).
50. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224-25 n.59 (1940). Sherman Act § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1964), proscribes monopolizing, attempting to monopolize, and conspiring to monopolize interstate or foreign commerce.
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found the inference "irresistible" that price competition had been
chilled. 151 Justice Fortas, in a concurring opinion, remarked that
"although [the evidence is] not overwhelming, [it] is sufficient in
the special circumstances of this case to show an actual effect on
pricing ...." 152 Finally, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Harlan
and Stewart in a dissenting opinion, stated that he could not agree
with the majority or the concurrence that the combination "had the
purpose or effect of restricting price competition ...." 58
In reversing the decision of the district court, the majority looked
to the period involved in the complaint, 1955-1963, and noted that,
despite the excess supply and the dmvnward-sloping price levels, the
industry expanded from thirty manufacturers with forty-nine plants
to fifty-one manufacturers with ninety-eight plants. Although entry
into the industry appears to have been relatively easy during this
period,154 the Court was unable to come to any other conclusion
than that the continued entry was caused by, and was a sufficient
indication of, a price structure that was kept artificially high. The
Court's inference may have been economically unwarranted, for it
seems to have been based upon a static rather than a dynamic
economic analysis. Certainly, in a perfectly competitive market
moving toward equilibrium, such continued entry would not have
occurred. But as the dissent points out, in the eight-year period
covered by the complaint, the demand for corrugated containers
almost doubled.155 It is just as logical, then, to assume that new
entrants were attracted by an anticipated future demand as it is to
assume that they were drawn by the possibility of charging artificially
high prices.
Indeed, Justice Marshall emphatically objected to the Government's hypothesis that new entrants were attracted by high profits:
"[T]he Government did not introduce any evidence about the level
of profits in this industry [or, surprisingly enough,] evidence about
price levels." 56 Again he stated: "The Government admits that the
price trend was down, but asks the Court to assume that the trend
would have been accelerated with less informed and, hence more
vigorous, price competition."57 In fact, while it had ample op51. 393 U.S. at 337.
52. 393 U.S. at 339.
53. 393 U.S. at 340. A hint of the theory of oligopolistic competition adopted by
the majority in Container Corporation is found in Sugar Institute v. United States,
297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936): "The fact that because Sugar is a standardized commodity,
there is a strong tendency towards uniformity of price, makes it the more important
that such opportunities as may exist for fair competition should not be impaired."
54. The Court itself stated that an investment of $50,000 to $75,000 was sufficient
for entry into the industry. 393 U.S. at 336.
55. 393 U.S. at 342.
56. 393 U.S. at 345.
57. 393 U.S. at 345.
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portunity to do so, the Government at no time called customers
of the industry to testify concerning price stabilization.58
Furthermore, Justice Marshall in his dissent referred to findings
by the trial court which tend to dampen the "irresistible inference"
that price competition had in fact been lessened. 59 Those findings
indicate that, despite an increase in manufacturing costs, the trend
in prices was down. Indeed, rather than finding an absence of price
competition, the district court reported that buyers frequently
changed suppliers on the basis of price considerations. The statistics
compiled by the industry and stipulated by the Justice Department
showed a marked absence of price uniformity or price stability.
Moreover, substantial evidence was introduced that the determination of price by manufacturers was based not only on the knowledge
of prices offered by competitors, but also on other input variables
such as plant production, the quality of needed materials, the size
of the order, and the credit rating of the customer.60
Justice Marshall's doubts about the absence of price competition
are reinforced by the fact that the complaint issued by the Government named only the eighteen defendants and did not indicate
whether any or all of the other thirty-three manufacturers in the
industry, which together accounted for ten per cent of industry
shipments, participated in the price exchange program. 61 Since the
record is silent on the matter, it is at least arguable that they did
not participate. This inference raises two interesting questions.
First, if they did not participate, why were their attempts to secure
new business insufficient to guarantee vigorous price competition
in the industry? Second, accepting the argument that small and
weak firms in a market dominated by oligopolists are willing to
follow the price leadership afforded by the larger concerns, how
did the small manufacturers in this case effectively secure the price
information necessary for them to follow the defendants? The apparent ability of the small firms to secure the price information
without resort to price exchanges serves to enhance the argument
advanced by the defendants in Container Corporation that, in light
of the numerous other means of communication, reciprocal price
exchanges play a relatively small part in market operations.
In view of the ambiguities present in the Container Corporation
opinion, some confusion remains as to the correct rule to be applied
when analyzing a system of price exchanges in order to determine
58. 393 U.S. at 345.
59. 393 U.S. at 345-46.
60. It appears from the opinion of the district court that knowledge of the prices
charged by competitors was far more often gleaned from customers and other sources
than directly from the competitors themselves. See 273 F. Supp. at 61.
61. Container Corp., 393 U.S. at 343 n.1 (Justice Marshall, dissenting).
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whether or not the Sherman Act has been violated. It is not clear
whether the Court in this case adopted a per se rule of illegality or a
very stringent rule-of-reason approach.
There is language in the majority opinion which strongly hints
at the adoption of the per se rule. While it is true that Justice
Department spokesmen have for some time indicated their support
of "proper" systems of price exchanges,62 the Court's opinion seems
to offer some support to those who would invalidate such programs
entirely by invoking a per se rule. Thus, the Court stated:
The limitation or reduction of price competition brings the case
within the ban, for as we held in United States v. Socony-Vacuum
Oil Co., •.. interference with the setting of price by free market
forces is unlawful per se.63

At the close of its opinion, the Court offered this additional suggestion: "Price is too critical, too sensitive a control to allow it to
be used, even in an informal manner to restrain competition." 64
Such language indicates, at a minimum, that the majority took a
very dim view of exchanges of price information.
The Court did not, however, expressly label the activity as a per se
offense.65 In this connection, Justice Fortas noted in his concurring
opinion: "I do not understand the Court's opinion to hold that the
exchange of specific information among sellers as to price charged
to individual buyers, pursuant to mutual arrangements, is a per se
violation of the Sherman Act." 66 Justice Fortas may have attached
too little importance to the decision, since it is difficult to imagine
62. Galgay, Antitrust Considerations in the Exchange of Price Information Among
Competitors, 8 ANTITRUST BULL. 617, 619 (1963) (fhe author was then chief of the
New York office of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice.): "Let me
hasten to say that the mere exchange of price information among competitors is not
in itself illegal. It is the role which such an exchange plays in any agreement to
tamper with price competition which determines its propriety." Turner, supra note
3, at 866 (fhe author was then Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division.):
[I]t has always been and remains clear that competitors are free to collect and
disseminate considerable amounts of data pertinent to informed business decisions,
even though it is likely that informed judgments by various individual competitors may produce somewhat different price and other decisions than would
otherwise take place.
See note 84 infra.
63. 393 U.S. at 337. The Court clearly limited this analysis to situations involving
oligopolistic elements by adding the following to the language quoted in the text:
"Price information exchanged in some markets may have no effect on a truly competitive price. But the corrugated container industry is dominated by relatively few
sellers." 393 U.S. at 337.
64. 393 U.S. at 338.
65. But see Interphoto Corp. v. Minolta Corp., 295 F. Supp. 711, 717-18 (S.D.N.Y.
1969): "Without inquiry into their purpose or effect, many agreements have been
held to be illegal per se under the antitrust laws. See, e.g., United States v. Container
Corporation of America . • ••"
66. 393 U.S. at 338-39.
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a situation after Container Corporation in which sellers would exchange particularized price information, at least with regard to current and future prices to specified customers. But Fortas' statement
does offer the insight that the Court, while mindful that it was approaching the brink of the per se test, hesitated-at this time-from
crossing the final line. There are several possible reasons for such
hesitancy. Historically, the per se rule has been applied only to situations in which there is an "inference or presumption" either that
the primary intent underlying the practice involved is to achieve
an anticompetitive effect, or that, absent such intent, a high probability remains that the efficiency of the practice will be outweighed
by an anticompetitive effect. 67 As previously mentioned, there are
sound economic considerations which might justify a program such
as that before the Court in Container Corporation. 68 Furthermore,
it may be that the Court implicitly recognized that, in light of the
limited level of economic knowledge, it is difficult to define with any
degree of certainty the level of economic concentration in an oligopolistic market sufficient for that market to behave monopolistically.69
Thus, the Court may have found it much easier and just as effective
to apply a stringent test under the rule of reason to determine the
effect upon prices.70
Assuming that the Court did not adopt a per se test-and that
assumption is by no means certain-it still seems to have indicated
that it will not tolerate significant effects upon the price structure
arising from the exchange of information. The Court stated that
"[t]he result of this reciprocal exchange of prices was to stabilize
prices though at a dmrnward level," 71 and added that "[s]tabilizing
prices as well as raising them is within the ban of § 1 of the Sherman
Act." 72 Moreover, it cited Socony-Vacuum for the principle that "in
terms of market operations stabilization is but one form of manipula67. See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, 74 YALE L.J. 775 (1967);
Van Cise, Future of Per Se in Antitrust, 50 VA. L. REv. 1165, 1172 (1964).
68. See text accompanying notes 1-3 supra.
69. The problem of market definition will doubtless be of considerable importance
in future applications of the principles of Container Corporation. It is conceivable
that differing types of price exchanges might be permissible if there are differing
economic concentrations and conditions. There are, of course, some markets characterized by so concentrated an oligopolistic framework-markets such as steel, aluminum,
oil, and sugar-that any price exchange at all would automatically be invalidated. The
number of competitors, however, might not be crucial in determining the economic
conditions of the market. See C. KAYSEN &: D. TURNER, supra note 46, at 150; Adelman,
supra note 46, at 1299. In Container Corporation, for example, the market consisted
of fifty-one producers, yet the Court deemed an oligopolistic analysis to be appropriate.
393 U.S. at 336-37.
70. See 393 U.S. at 841 Gustice Marshall, dissenting).
71. 393 U.S. at 336.
72. 393 U.S. at 337.
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tion. " 73 Nevertheless, it is difficult to imagine that the Court, in
attacking stabilization, meant to condemn all attempts to narrow
the range and extreme variations of prices quoted at a given price
level. Price stabilization has usually been thought to refer not only
to fluctuations of price level, but also to extremes of variation within
the price structure at any given average level. Yet to interpret the
ban on stabilization as expressed in Socony-Vacuum to condemn attempts to control extreme variations would not be merely novel, but
in direct contradiction with the opinion expressed by the Court
in numerous previous instances.74 Moreover, in the twenty-five years
since Socony-Vacuum was decided, the Court does not seem ever to
have used that case to prevent the stabilization of extreme variations
within the price structure. In many ways such a reading of the
Court's opinion would entail more significant consequences than
would a determination of the per se illegality of price exchanges.
Certainly, a few systems of price exchange would survive such a
test. Moreover, the logic of a holding that prohibits all types of stabilizations would condemn many other forms of information exchange. It has been estimated that seventy-five per cent of all trade
associations have a statistical reporting system of some sort.75 Conceivably a re-examination of the effect of these statistics, particularly
in the areas of production, inventory, and retail sales, might result
in the demonstration of a stabilizing factor on the supply conditions
73. 393 U.S. at 337, citing United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150,
223 (1940).
74. Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582 (1925):
It is not, we think, open to question that the dissemination of pertinent
information concerning any trade or business tends to stabilize that trade or
business and to produce uniformity of price and trade practice. Exchange of price
quotations of market commodities tends to produce uniformity of prices in markets of the world. Knowledge of the supplies of available merchandise tends to
prevent overproduction and to avoid the economic disturbances produced by
business crises resulting from overproduction.
Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 598 (1936):
Nor does the fact that the correction of abuses may tend to stabilize a business, or
to produce fairer price levels, require that abuses should go uncorrected or that
an effort to correct them should for that reason alone be stamped as an unreasonable restraint of trade. • • . The natural effect of the acquisition of the
wider and more scientific knowledge of business conditions on the minds of those
engaged in commerce, and the consequent stabilizing of production and price,
cannot be said to be an unreasonable restraint or in any respect unlawful.
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 374 (1933): "The intelligent
conduct of commerce through the acquisition of full information of all relevant facts
may properly be sought by the co-operation of those engaged in trade, although
stabilization of trade and more reasonable prices may be the result." Board of Trade
of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1917): "The true test of legality is
whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby encourages competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."
75. See Jacobs, Statistical, Standardization, and Research Activities [of Trade Associations], 6 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST PROC. 80, 81 (1955).
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and hence on price. One commentator, struck by the potential scope
of the Container Corporation opinion, has complained-and justifiably so if the above interpretation is correct-that "the opinion
could be read as making it hazardous to furnish price data to newspapers or trade journals." 76
It is not at all clear that the majority opinion stands for so
sweeping a definition of the term "stabilization." Certainly neither
Justice Fortas nor Justice Marshall and the other dissenters would
so apply the law. However, all three opinions can be read to support
the position that price exchanges leading to stabilization are illegal
when evidence is present that the price level itself has also been
affected. Justice Fortas stated that "[t]he obvious effect was to 'stabilize' prices by joint arrangement-at least to limit any price cuts
to the minimum necessary to meet competition." 77 The dissent
emphasized the lack of evidence indicating an effect upon price
levels and the necessity for such proof to justify the finding of a
violation.78 The majority opinion, too, hinted at such a rule. In
finding that "[t]he exchange of price information seemed to have
the effect of keeping prices within a fairly narrow ambit," 70 the
majority discussed the probability that while prices had sloped downward, they would have declined even further had the information
exchange not existed.
If such an interpretation of the rule is correct, then the differences among the majority, the concurrence, and the dissent become
simply a matter of the sufficiency of proof required to prove an effect
upon the price level. The majority was satisfied by an "inference,"
perhaps even a slim inference, of an effect on price levels. 80 Justice
Fortas felt that the "probability" that the exchange of specific price
information led to an unlawful effect was adequate. 81 The dissenters
would have required substantial proof. 82
Under such an interpretation, the opinion in Container Corporation can be construed as consistent with precedent and practice.
Antitrust lawyers have long advised their clients that notwithstanding Tag Manufacturers and Cement Manufacturers, the exchange of
particularized information dealing with prices is suspect. 83 They
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
BI.
82.
83.
Kem,
62, 78

Hale, Communication Among Competitors, B ANTITRUsr BULL. 63, 69 (1969).
393 U.S. at 340.
393 U.S. at 341-45.
393 U.S. at 336.
See 393 U.S. at 337.
See 393 U.S. at 339.
See 393 U.S. at 344.
See G. LAMB & s. KlITELLE, TRADE ASSOCIATION LAW AND PRACTICE 68 (1956);
Price Reporting by Trade Associations, 6 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRusr PROC.
(1955); Withrow, Trade Associations, 4 ANTITRUsr BULL. 173, 181 (1959); Com-
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have recognized that the dicta in Maple Flooring and the line of
cases following it, were perhaps too broad in parts to be successfully
reconciled with the anti-price-fixing and anti-price-stabilization
policies of Socony-Vacuum. Particularized price information, they
have realized, lends itself easily to concerted price-fixing activities
and to an unconscious, but nonetheless direct, effect upon the price
level,84 especially when current and future price information is exchanged.85
ment, Trade Association Statistics and Anti-Trust Laws, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 380, 384
(1951). See also note 91 infra.
84. Turner, supra note 3, at 866 (footnote omitted):
In oligopoly situations, too quick and too detailed a dissemination of information
may make the market perform worse rather than better. It is generally recognized
that elements of informational schemes which some might think innocuous may
be used not for the purpose of promoting rational independent judgment, but for
the purpose of discouraging price competition. One immediately suspects an
illicit purpose, for example, in any informational scheme which involves the
identification of individual sellers and buyers in each reported transaction. Normally, this is completely unnecessary to any market information scheme looking
only to rational competitive pricing decisions. Even if the data need to be broken
down geographically because there are different submarkets, there still is normally no need for identifying particular sellers. Consequently, it is reasonable
to assume that the purpose of the identification is to detect and thus to discourage the would be price-cutter.
See note 62 supra.
85. One recurring antitrust dilemma not treated by the Court in Container Corporation is that involving the dissemination and publication of data to outside
sources. The basic law concerning dissemination of statistics was expressed in the case
of Sugar Institute v. United States, 297 U.S. 553 (1936). In that case the trial court,
after discussing the Supreme Court's decisions in previous trade association cases, held
that the failure to make more complete disclosures to the trade of statistics collected
and circulated within their own ranks is an unreasonable restraint of trade. 297 U.S.
at 604. The Supreme Court modified the injunction of the lower court. It agreed
that in certain cases the "purchasing and distributing trade have a legitimate interest,"
but it stated that
it does not follow that the purchasing and distributing trade have such an interest
in every detail of information which may be received by the Institute. Information
may be received in relation to the affairs of refiners which may rightly be treated
as having a confidential character and in which distributors and purchasers have
no proper interest.
297 U.S. at 604. Thus, the Court manifested its preference that unless a strong policy
dictates to the contrary, there should be open dissemination of the information
gathered. See Maple Flooring Mfrs. Assn. v. United States, 268 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1925).
But the Court also made clear that it would look at nondisclosure not as an illegal
action in itself, but as symptomatic of other practices which are illegal. The trial
court had aptly summarized the Supreme Court's position: "It is thus abundantly clear
that just as the secrecy in respect of statistics is an element of illegality in the
'Column &: Lumber Company' and 'Linseed Oil' cases, so did the publicity given
thereto tend to negate the illegality in the Maple Flooring case." 15 F. Supp. 817, 898
(S.D.N.Y. 1934). Cf. Tag Mfrs. Institute v. FTC, 174 F.2d 452, 462 (1st Cir. 1949), in
which the court of appeals said: "We are clearly of the opinion that if the reporting
agreement is otherwise unobjectionable, it cannot be said to have become illegal for
failure of the subscribers to make the information generally available." See also
Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 U.S. 386, 429 (1945), in which the Supreme
Court stated: "The requirement that all trade information be given to the public
would render the assembly of it for the information of members useless and indeed
detrimental to competition. The inclusion of such a provision in an antitrust decree
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An example of the exchange of such sensitive data is found in
a recent district court decision, United States v. FMC Corporation. 86
In that case a group of chlor-alkali producers were charged with a
conspiracy to eliminate price competition in the sale of some of their
raw-material products. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania found that an illegal conspiracy
existed along the lines both of that in Socony-Vacuum and of that
in Container Corporation. The per se violation consisted of "implied
assurances and agreements" which led to a uniform system of freight
rate pricing. That system iri turn ensured complete information
within the industry of all manufacturers' freight rates. As the district court pointed out, in industries in which a single commodity
price prevails, such as both the chlor-alkali industry and the corrugated-container industry, knowledge of competitors' freight rates
leads to universal price knowledge and, under the theory of oligopolistic pricing, uniformity of price. The trial court also found a
more subtle violation of section I, similar to, though more pronounced than, the violation in Container Corporation. In F1'.1C,
as is usual in such cases, the manufacturers were faced with a highly
inelastic demand for their product and with no probability of increased sales to be derived from price cutting. Moreover, several
of the industry's major customers from time to time found some
chlor-alkali products to be fungible with other raw materials. In
such situations, selective price cuts were made to specific customers,
for the limited purpose of meeting competition from outside the
industry. FMC and the other industry manufacturers occasionally
informed each other of such selective discounts, apparently to impress one another with the limited purpose of the action. The
district court held that this dissemination of price information in
an effort to control industry-wide repercussions fell under the ban
of Container Corporation.
It is not possible to know how much weight the courts in Container Corporation and FMC gave to the fact that current and future
prices were exchanged or to the fact that they were exchanged surreptitiously, that is, without full knowledge of parties other than
the manufacturers. As the FMC court said, however, it is well in
such cases to keep in mind the admonitions of the Supreme Court
in Maple Flooring:

[E]ach case arising under the Sherman Act must be determined upon
has been disapproved by this co_urt." However, a survey of trade association consent
decrees indicates the disfavor with which the courts, in practice, have viewed nondisclosure. Given the strong policy evinced by the Court in Container Corporation
against price information exchanges in any form, it would now seem wise to make the
information readily and equally accessible both to purchasers and other parties.
86. 5 CCH TRADE

REG.

REP. (1969 Trade Cas.) 1) 72,901 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 1969).
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the particular facts disclosed by the record, and that the op1ruons
in those cases must be read in light of their facts and of a clear
recognition of the essential differences in the facts of those cases,
and in the facts of any new case to which the rule of earlier decisions
is to be applied.B7
Because a market characterized by an oligopolistic price structure
is particularly influenced by inputs of price information, it does
not seem particularly unreasonable to adopt a harsh attitude toward price exchanges. But since the exchanges of prices and other
market information can be accomplished in many forms-some involving substantially less risk than others of chilling price competition-it would be unreasonable and harmful to condemn all such
forms out of hand under a per se rule which was only obliquely
suggested by the majority opinion in Container Corporation.BB Thus,
the "rule of reason" interpretation seems to be the more appropriate
reading of the Court's holding.
87. 268 U.S. 563, 579 (1925).
88. Section 2(b) of the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1964), provides:
Nothing herein contained shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima-facie case
thus made by showing that his lower price was made in good faith to meet an
equally low price of a competitor, or the services or facilities furnished by a
competitor.
In interpreting this provision dealing with the "meeting the competition" defense, the
Supreme Court in FTC v. A.E. Staley Mfg. Co., 324 U.S. 746, 759-60 (1946), stated:
Section 2(b) does not require the seller to justify price discriminations by showing
that in fact they met a competitive price. But it does place on the seller the
burden of showing that the price was made in good faith to meet a competitor's.
• • • The statute at least requires the seller, who knowingly discriminated in price,
to show the existence of facts which would lead a reasonable and prudent person
to believe that the granting of a lower price would in fact meet the equally low
price of a competitor.
In view of this language, antitrust attorneys have long counseled their clients to grant
discriminatory lower prices "only when [they] know in advance that a competitor is
offering a lower price to a given customer, as attempts to justify lower prices extended
without such price knowledge have not always met with success." McClatchey, PriceDiscrimination, Meeting Competition and Promotional Allowances, 29 OHIO ST. L.J.
314, 326 (1968). It has not, of course, been generally recommended that to benefit from
the "meeting the competition" defense under the Robinson-Patman Act, a client
should check with a competitor. The possible implications of doing so were evident
even before Container Corporation. However, the very real problem of verification
remains and may be greatly exacerbated by an apparent conflict between the teaching
of Container Corporation and the increasingly rigid burden of showing "good faith"
which was exemplified in the recent case of Viviano Macaroni Co. v. FTC, 411 F.2d
255 (3d Cir. 1969). In that case, the court of appeals held that the defendant had failed
to fulfill its duty to investigate or verify the oral communication of its customer concerning a competitive offer, despite the fact that its salesman of eighteen years corroborated the customer's report. The court did say, however, that it sympathized with
the difficulty facing the petitioner in finding precise information as to the identity of
the competitor and the amount of the offers. 411 F.2d at 258. Thus, if Viviano Macaroni
stands for the proposition that a "meeting the competition" defense cannot be maintained by seeking verification with the buyer or with one's own salesman, and if
Container Corporation clearly precludes checking with the competitor, what possible
method is left in most instances to verify adequately the existence of a competitive
offer? See Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. R.Ev. 161, 177 (1970).
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Moreover, the stringent "rule of reason" test arguably formulated
in Container Corporation would probably not have disastrous practical implications, since the vast majority of statistical exchange
programs in the United States are managed in a far more discrete
manner than was used in the Container Corporation situation.
Usually, a statistical exchange is handled through the offices of a
private statistical-compiling service retained by an industry-wide
trade association. As in Maple Flooring, each competitor sends his
own specific statistical data to the central agency, and the agency
in turn compiles the information into averages, categorized by product and geography. The general averages are then disseminated
not only to manufacturers but also to all interested parties. Thus,
each seller knows only the industry-wide price structure and is able
to compare that structure with its own prices.89 Clearly, this procedure involves a "stabilization" of prices to the extent that it imposes
some price order in the industry. But arguably the effect on price
competition is not at all the same as it was in Container Corporation
in which it was found that the sellers met or just slightly undercut
prices quoted by the relevant competitor. The ordinary program,
it can be argued, is still legitimate after Container Corporation. The
quality of the price information exchanged, not the existence of the
exchange, would be determinative.
Regardless of the difficulties in interpreting the Court's holding,
however, it is clear at least that the opinion in Container Corporation vests great opportunities for discretion and flexibility in the
Justice Department and in the Federal Trade Commission. The
Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division,
Richard A. McClaren, has already stated that Container Corporation "stands for the proposition that such checking with competitors,
where it has become a prevalent market practice, constitutes a violation of Section I of the Sherman Act. " 90 It appears, however, that
the Justice Department has not yet served notice that it intends to
use this case to invalidate all statistical- or price-reporting services.
The situation as it now stands can best be summarized in the words
89. See G. LAMB & S. KrrrEu.E, supra note 26, at 32.
90. Speech before the Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, 5 CCH
TRADE REG. REP. 1f 50,235, at 55,469 (March 27, 1969) (emphasis added):
I doubt that the Supreme Court's recent decision in Container Corporation
has materially changed the advice that the antitrust bar has been giving to clients
for, lo, these many years. You have advised and, in private practice, I advised:
"Don't call up your competitor to check if he actually made the offer your cus•
tomer claims to have received." w·e thought-if he gives you a dishonest answer,
it is worthless; if he is honest, you have antitrust problems. Container confirms
the latter point. It stands for the proposition that such checking with competitors,
where it has become a prevalent market practice, constitutes a violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Act. In a future case, on similar facts, I think we would have to
give serious consideration to filing on the criminal side.
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of Justice Holmes: "Certainty generally is an illusion, repose is
not the destiny of man." 91

91. The Path of the Law, 10 HA~v. L. Rav. 457, 466 (1897).

